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International Coalitions and NonMilitarily Contributing Member States:
A Perspective from Panama’s Practice
and the Law of Neutrality
Alonso E. Illueca
Abstract: The military actions of an International Coalition
and the role of its non-military contributing member States
is yet another fundamental example of international practice
concerning conflation between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello. Although International Law proscribes the use of
force in international relations, membership in an International Coalition engaged in military operations does not
come without a cost. Non-military contributing member
States may be regarded as co-belligerents or neutral States
violating the laws of neutrality. This article argues that mere
membership in a coalition does not amount to co-belligerency. Nevertheless, it claims that membership could entail a
violation of the laws of neutrality, authorizing the use of
countermeasures or lawful reprisals. The article analyzes
the practice of Panama as part of the allies in World War II,
the coalition of willing in Iraq (2003), and the coalition to
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counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria (2015). In doing so, it considers the applicable laws and possible conflicts between jus ad
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Does a State’s mere membership in an international coalition automatically translate into co-belligerency? Can the State become a
party to an armed conflict without actually firing a single bullet or
even providing material support to one of the belligerents? The laws
of neutrality and recent State practice provide useful guidance in asserting that a neutral power’s violation of its status does not ipso
facto mean co-belligerency. While violations of neutrality, such as
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openly expressing support for one of the belligerents in an armed
conflict, may legitimize the aggrieved State (one of the belligerents)
to adopt countermeasures or undertake lawful reprisals, this violation should not be understood as a carte blanche for the lawful use
of force against the State in question.
This article specifically analyzes the practice of Panama as a
case study, which consists of joining several coalitions without actually engaging in armed hostilities. Three cases related to Panama’s
participation in international coalitions will be analyzed in light of
the applicable principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. These
include Panama’s participation in World War II (“WWII”) as a “cobelligerent”, its incorporation to the United States of America
(“U.S.”) led coalitions against Iraq in 2003 and against Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) in 2015.
The practice of Panama in this regard deserves special consideration as the country lacks a standing army, and it is not or was not
actively engaged in hostilities in either of the above-mentioned conflicts. After the 1989 U.S. military intervention, Panama decided to
abolish its army.1 Furthermore, in 1994, Panama established,
through a Constitutional reform,2 the prohibition of the country possessing an army.3
After the end of WWII and with the advent of the United Nations
(“U.N.”), international law was revolutionized with the entry into
force of the U.N. Charter and the general prohibition on the threat
or the use of force.4 This prohibition allows only for two general
exceptions, as specified in the U.N. Charter, which are individual or
1

RENÉ DE LA PEDRAJA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARMED
FORCES OF MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
2000-2014 211 (2014).
2
ORLANDO J. PEREZ, POLITICAL CULTURE IN PANAMA:
DEMOCRACY AFTER INVASION 93-94 (2011) (elaborating on the process for
abolishing the army and reforming the constitution).
3
CONST. POL. PAN. [Constitution] art. 310 (1972) am. 1994.
4
U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶4; see, e.g., Corfu Channel (Alb. v. U.K.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (April 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶181-95 (June
27); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, 244, ¶37-38 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep.
136, ¶87 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda 2005 Rep. 168, ¶148, 162-65 (December 19).
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collective self-defense5 and collective action sanctioned by the U.N.
Security Council (“UNSC”).6 With this general prohibition in place,
contemporary jus ad bellum was established, regulating the resort to
armed force in inter-state relations.7 Contemporary jus ad bellum
renders declarations of war as unnecessary tools for unilaterally advancing the State’s national policy interests and, arguably, as illegal
threats to the use of force.8
As evidenced by the participation of several States9 in WWII
through non-military contributions, a State could become a co-belligerent in the course of an armed conflict without actually engaging
in military hostilities or using force. Did this state of affairs survive
the establishment of contemporary jus ad bellum? The answer to this
question lies in a legal analysis based in the principles of jus in bello,
i.e., international humanitarian law (“IHL”), and jus ad bellum.10
While jus in bello generally regulates conduct beyond the scope of
jus ad bellum - such as civil wars and protection of civilians during
armed conflict - sometimes certain principles of such areas of international law operate concurrently.11 The present article aims at explaining the legal consequences of a State’s participation in an international military coalition, in the specific circumstance where
such State does not resort to the use of armed force (jus ad bellum).
This article does not intend to settle questions of State responsibility for military actions or problems associated with differing
5

U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003
I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶51 (November 6).
6
See generally U.N. Charter art. 39-51.
7
Robert Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L.
47, 49, 64–65 (2008) (explaining the advent of contemporary Jus Ad Bellum).
8
U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶4; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOL.
73, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 365 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) [Hereinafter THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK].
9
Allied powers, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Allied-Powers-international-alliance (listing as allied powers
States such as Uruguay, Nicaragua, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Bolivia
and Ecuador).
10
Sloane, supra note 7, at 67-68 (explaining the jus ad bellum-in bello relationship in the U.N. Charter era).
11
But see Id. at 67-68 (stating that presently jus ad bellum and in bello principles can often operate concurrently).
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treaty obligations. The main question is context specific, i.e., an ongoing-armed conflict, and concerns a State not participating in hostilities. It focuses on whether the actions of such State (violations of
the laws of neutrality) are grave enough under IHL to drag it into
the armed conflict as a co-belligerent.
In order to uniformly address the questions presented, this article
is organized in five parts: this brief introduction, three legal argumentation sections and a conclusion. Section I provides an overview
of Panama’s incorporation to the above-mentioned military coalitions and the reasons provided for such incorporation, it also characterizes the conflicts in which such coalitions were/are engaged as
either International Armed Conflict or Non-International Armed
Conflict. Section II considers relevant concepts of the law of neutrality in international armed conflicts, such as violations of neutrality and co-belligerent designations. Section III suggests that Panama
should be considered as either a co-belligerent state or a state that
violated the laws of neutrality in the above mentioned conflicts. It
also describes the legal consequences for Panama and the rights of
the aggrieved belligerents vis-à-vis Panama.
II.
INCORPORATION TO INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS
In the last fifteen years, Panama has joined two international coalitions without contributing military forces to their strategic objectives.12 In both occasions the President adopted a unilateral decision,
without the prior approval of the National Assembly (legislative
power).13 Moreover, it failed to present a concise legal reasoning for
such decisions, along with an analysis of its immediate and future
consequences.14 One factor that has been repeatedly ignored is the
impact that the applicable rules of IHL may have in elucidating the
12

‘Coalition of the Willing’, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 27, 2003,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/27/coalition-of-thewilling/cdb82022-5b70-4650-9b8b-2f6f544e4cdd/?utm_term=.79fe8e974bb3;
Elisa Vásquez, Panama Joins Coalition against ISIS Despite Having No Army,
PANAM POST, Feb. 9, 2015, https://panampost.com/elisa-vasquez/2015/02/09
/panama-joins-coalition-against-isis-despite-having-no-army/.
13
Id. (in both cases Panama’s Executive Power only issued an official statement on the decision without prior participation or approval by the legislature).
14
Id. (the official statements can be better framed as mere statements of support due to the absence of any concrete reasoning or analysis).
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consequences of Panama’s membership in such coalitions, which
could affect its status as a neutral State in those conflicts.15 Particularly, the rules of neutrality have been sidelined and the analysis has
been simplified to a mere question of jus ad bellum.16 Nonetheless,
it is Panama’s own practice during WWII as part of the Allied block
and a co-belligerent that best illustrates the special consideration
that should be given to jus in bello, and, in particular, the laws of
neutrality, whenever jus ad bellum is not effectively observed and
implemented.17
Prior to analyzing the consequences of Panama’s actions in the
last fifteen years, it is necessary to describe and analyze its participation in three military coalitions: the Allies (WWII), the Coalition
of the Willing, and the Coalition to counter the ISIL. In doing, special consideration will be provided to the purposes and objectives of
these coalitions. Additionally, the role of Panama as a member will
be analyzed. Lastly, each of the conflicts in question will be characterized as either international or non-international in light of IHL.
a.

The Allies and WWII
On December 10, 1941, three days after the Empire of Japan
(“Japan”) attack on the United States (“U.S.”) at Pearl Harbor in
Hawaii, the Panamanian Legislature enacted Law 104, which declared war against Japan.18 In the same legal instrument, the Executive Power was authorized to declare war against any power allied
to Japan.19 Subsequently, on December 12, 1941, the Executive
Power enacted two Decrees in which Panama declared war to Germany20 and Italy21.

15
See, Paul Seger, The Law of Neutrality, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 248 (Andrew Clapham
& Paola Gaeta, eds., 2014) (for an introduction to the law of neutrality).
16
See, Okimoto Keichiro, The Relationship between Jus Ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE USE OF FORCE 1209, 1209-24 (Mark Weller, ed, 2015).
17
See, Sloane, supra note 7, at 64 (as WWII occurred prior to the UN Charter
era, jus in bello was the only applicable body of law at the time).
18
Ley no. 104, Dec. 10, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.).
19
Id.
20
Decreto no. 14, Dec. 12, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.).
21
Decreto no. 15, Dec. 12, 1941, LEG. PAN. (Pan.).
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On January 1, 1942, in the midst of WWII hostilities, the Republic of Panama, alongside twenty-five other nations, signed the “Declaration by the United Nations.”22 Such a declaration would later
constitute the basis for and one of the closest antecedents to the
United Nations organization.23 The text provides for a declaration of
war by the signatory States against the members of the Tripartite
Pact - Germany, Italy and Japan.24 Additionally, it established a collective state of belligerency for all the signatory states given their
“common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,” and the commitment they undertook to cooperate
among themselves and not to make any separate armistices or peace
agreements with the common enemies.25
Panamanian armed forces were never engaged in military hostilities with any of the members of the Tripartite Pact during
WWII.26 The only participation in hostilities, if it can be considered
as such, was the military buildup in areas neighboring the Panama
Canal after 1941.27 At that time, Panama’s sovereignty over certain
areas of its territory was contested given that Article III of the HayBunau-Varilla Treaty granted rights to the U.S. as “if it were the
sovereign” (sovereign rights) of the so-called Panama Canal Zone.28
Historic records provide that at the time, the U.S. stationed sixtyfive thousand soldiers in one-hundred thirty-six defense locations at

22

Declaration by the United Nations (Jan. 1, 1942), THE AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/decade03.asp [hereinafter
Declaration by the United Nations].
23
U.N. DEP’T OF PUB. INFO., THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY, at 3, U.N. Sales
No. E.08.I.6 (2008).
24
Mark Reeves, The Broad, Toiling Masses in all the Continents: Anticolonial Activists and the Atlantic Charter (2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Western
Kentucky University) (on file with TopScholar).
25
Declaration by the United Nations, supra note 22.
26
STEWART BREWER, BORDERS AND BRIDGES: A HISTORY OF
U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 109-11 (2006).
27
STENSON CONN ET AL., GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND
ITS OUTPOSTS 344, 353 (2000).
28
Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans art. III, Pan.-U.S. art. III Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat.
2234 [hereinafter Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty].
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the Canal Zone and other parts of Panamanian territory.29 The Fabrega-Wilson Treaty provided official permission to the U.S. to occupy defensive areas in Panamanian territory, apart from the Canal
Zone, which would terminate one year after the signature of the
peace treaty ending the war.30
Additionally, it has been recognized that Germany intended to
attack the Panama Canal due to the tactical advantage that the infrastructure represented to the United States.31 The attack plan was
known as “Operation Pelikan” or “Projekt 14” and was called off in
1943.32 Similarly, Japan had a plan to attack the Canal with special
submarines, I-400 Class, in order to halt the U.S. led offensive in the
Pacific.33 Notwithstanding that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty provided that “the Canal and its entrances shall be neutral in perpetuity,”34 German and Japanese forces considered the Canal to be a legitimate military objective during the course of WWII.35 It could be
argued, at the time, that the legitimacy of Germany and Japan’s perspective rested on the fact that they were not parties to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and therefore, they did not recognize the neutrality of the waterway. Moreover, it should also be considered that
while the U.S. proclaimed the Canal permanently neutral, its practice since 1904 was to exercise belligerent rights when engaged in

29
Reymundo Guardián Guerra, Evolucíon Histórica de la Presencia Militar
Norteamericana en Panamá [Historical Evolution of the North American Military
Presence in Panama], in EL CANAL DE PANAMA [THE PANAMA CANAL]
360, 397-98 (Juan Antonio Tack ed., 1999).
30
U.S., Panama Sign Pact on Defense Areas, THE GAZETTE (New York)
11 (May 19, 1942), https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1917&dat=19420
519&id=72YtAAAAIBAJ&sjid=A4kFAAAAIBAJ&pg=1033,2074155&hl=en.
31
LADISLAS FARGO, THE GAME OF FOXES: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF GERMAN ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT
BRITAIN DURING WORLD WAR II 51-54 (1971); RENE J. FRANCILLON,
JAPANESE AIRCRAFT OF THE PACIFIC WAR 294 (1970).
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., HENRY SAKAIDA ET AL., I-400, JAPAN’S SECRET
AIRCRAFT CARRYING STRIKE SUBMARINE: OBJECTIVE PANAMA
CANAL (2006); JOHN GOEGHEGAN, OPERATION STORM: JAPAN’S TOP
SECRET SUBMARINES AND ITS PLAN TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF
WORLD WAR II (2014).
34
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, supra note 28, at art. XVIII.
35
Guerra, supra note 29, at 398.
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hostilities.36 In World War I, the U.S. had initially proclaimed its
neutrality, but yielded it with a proclamation of belligerency, which
was extended to the Canal.37 The U.S. even proceeded to exercise
belligerent rights in the Canal by seizing six German ships after the
issuance of its proclamation.38 Considering this precedent and the
fact that the U.S. effectively closed the Canal to enemy ships once
it entered into WWII (1941),39 the legitimate military objective argument gains significant ground. In this sense, due to the strategic
importance of the Canal for the transit of troops from the Pacific to
the Atlantic (or vice versa), its destruction or injury would have offered a definite military advantage to the Tripartite Pact.40
Ralph Smith provides an interesting rationale for rejecting the
neutrality of a waterway in this context, and ergo supporting its status as a legitimate military objective once the State becomes a belligerent in the conflict.41 He asserts that there is no internationally
recognized legal authority establishing “rules for preserving the neutrality of a body of water within the territorial boundaries of a State
when the territorial sovereign is not itself neutral.”42 Smith articulates that there is no concept of neutrality applicable to a canal if the
littoral State (or the State in control of the waterway) becomes a belligerent.43 Consequently, he argues that such “a ‘regime of neutrality’ in a canal cannot be inviolable, but must give way to properly
exercised rights of self-defense.”44
The Panama Canal Zone and sovereign Panamanian territory
were used during WWII to conduct military exercises, defensive
36

See, RICHARD BAXTER, VIAS ACUATICAS INTERNACIONALES
[THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS] 213-216 (Agustín Contin
trans., UTHEA, 1967) (describing U.S. belligerent acts in the Panama Canal in
WWI and WWII).
37
Ralph Smith, Beyond the Treaties: Limitations on Neutrality in the Panama Canal, 4 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 18-19 (1978).
38
Id. at 19.
39
Id. at 19-20.
40
See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives under The Current Jus
In Bello, 78 INT’L L. STUDIES, 139, 146-47 (2002); Horace Robertson, The
Principle of the Military Objecitve in the Law of Armed Conflict, 8 U.S. AIR
FORCE ACADEMY J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 35, 40 (1997).
41
Smith, supra note 37, at 13.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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preparations, and for the transit of troops towards Europe or the Pacific.45 Although such portions of Panama’s territory were not under
its direct control at the time, it should be noted that Panama voluntarily leased portions of its territory to the U.S. for the duration of
the war.46 This was a sufficient ground to consider Panama a party
to the armed conflict. Moreover, and independent from this lease,
Panama was already considered a cobelligerent State in WWII because it issued “war declarations”47 against the Axis powers and
joined the “Declaration by the United Nations” as a signatory.48
b.

The Coalition of the Willing and the Iraq War of 2003
On March 27, 2003, the U.S. announced that it had assembled
an international coalition, comprised of forty-nine states, with the
purpose of dismantling Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and bringing that country into compliance with several resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”).49 The Coalition, named by the Bush Administration as the “Coalition of the
Willing,” was not an operation authorized by the UNSC; rather, it
was a multilateral effort beyond the legal scope of any international
organization.50 The press release issued by the White House stated
that the members of the coalition would contribute to such enterprise
in different capacities, including: direct military participation, logistical and intelligence support, specialized chemical/biological response teams, over-flight rights, humanitarian and reconstruction
aid, and political support.51 Panama was in the initial list of coalition
members provided by the White House.52
45

CONN ET AL., supra note 27, at 301-27.
Agreement for the Lease of Defense Sites in the Republic of Panama, Pan.U.S., May 18, 1942, 57 Stat. 1232 [hereinafter Fabrega-Wilson Treaty].
47
MICHAEL WALSH, ROUND ONE TO THE BARBARIANS 117-19
(2005) (Panama declared war on Germany and Italy on December 12, 1941 and
on Japan on December 8, 1941).
48
Declaration by the United Nations, supra note 22.
49
Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition
Members (March 27, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release – Coalition Members].
50
Raymond Hinnebusch, The Iraq War and International Relations: Implications for Small States, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 451, 455-57
(2006).
51
Press Release – Coalition Members, supra note 49.
52
Id.
46
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i. Panama Joins the Coalition of the Willing
By way of a Joint Presidential Declaration,53 issued by the heads
of State of Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras, these
Central-American States offered their support to the ultimatum proffered by the U.S. against Iraq to disarm and comply with relevant
UNSC Resolutions, or assume grave consequences.54 The Declaration expressed particular regret for Iraq’s defiance and material
breach of UNSC Resolution 1441.55 The Heads of State indicated
their belief “that now is the defining moment for the Iraqi government to disarm and cease its negative and dilatory attitude that encourages the suspicion of the presence of weapons of mass destruction on its territory.”56
Panama’s contributions to the coalition remain disputed to this
day.57 Although neither Panama nor the U.S. ever specified how the
former would contribute to the coalition, data compiled by ProCon58
suggests that such contribution was limited to political support.
There is no reliable evidence proving that Panama gave any type of
military, logistical or intelligence support, or even humanitarian
aid.59
The earliest expression of Panama’s political support to the Coalition is found in a public statement of March, 2003, in which the
then-President Moscoso said to the U.S. government, “my government understands your decision to grant to the Iraqi people the
53

Panamá se suma a aliados en Irak [Panama joins allies in Iraq], EL
MERCURIO (Chile), March 24, 2003, http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2003/03/24/107964/panama-se-suma-a-aliados-en-irak.html.
54
Critican apoyo Centroamericano al ataque a Irak [Critics to the CentralAmerican support to the attack against Iraq], LOS ANDES (Argentina), (March
18, 2003), http://archivo.losandes.com.ar/notas/2003/3/18/un-292581.asp.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Accord Id. (citing reactions from Panamanian political figures).
58
Coalition Forces in Iraq, PROCON.ORG (September 1, 2010),
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000677;
ProCon.org,
Country Participation in US-led Coalition in Iraq (June 27, 2008),
http://usiraq.procon.org/view.additional-resource.php?resourceID=700.
59
David Morrison, Who’s who in the Coalition of the Willing, LABOUR &
TRADE UNION REVIEW (May 2003), http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/iraq/
coalition-of-willing.htm (all things considered, some member States such as Panama were only “publicly committed” with the goals of the coalition).
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chance to enjoy democracy, peace and respect for human rights.”60
Records suggest that after December 2003, Panama withdrew from
the coalition alongside twelve other States.61
ii. The 2003 Iraq War as an International Armed Conflict
The Operation “Iraqi Freedom” carried out by the U.S.-led coalition to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein and disarm Iraq of its
alleged arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) can be considered an International Armed Conflict (“IAC”). According to
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (“GCs”), an
IAC is any “armed conflict, which may arise between two or more
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.”62 In the present case, the U.S., the United
Kingdom, Australia and other member states of the coalition, which
contributed to the offensive phase of the invasion, were parties to
the GCs prior to the initiation of hostilities.63 Moreover, Iraq ratified

60

Press Release, The White House, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Statement of
Support from Coalition (March 26, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release – Statement
of Support].
61
Coalition Forces in Iraq, PROCON.ORG (September 1, 2010), http://usiraq.
procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000677.
62
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[Hereinafter I Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [Hereinafter II Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [Hereinafter III Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War Geneva, art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Hereinafter IV Geneva Convention].
63
State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other
Related Treaties, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountry.xsp (last visited
Nov. 3, 2017).
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the four GCs in February 14, 1956.64 The exercise of military hostilities between the two contending sides was undeniable.65 Therefore, the conflict’s initial phase (invasion and occupation) constituted an IAC.
After the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the UNSC recognized
the United Kingdom and the U.S. as occupying powers through resolution 1483 adopted on May 22, 2003. After the end of the occupation, the newly established Iraqi government invited U.S. forces
to remain in Iraq’s territory under a Status of Forcers Agreement
(“SOFA”).66 After the U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, a
conflict of sectarian character escalated, mostly between Sunni and
Shia groups, spreading to neighboring Syria and radicalizing the
Syrian Civil War.67
c.
The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and the Current
Situation in Iraq and Syria
With the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(“ISIL” - a former Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq) in Iraqi territory and
its expansion to neighboring Syria, the situation in the Middle East
reached a historical peak in regards to violations of human rights,
IHL, and the rule of law.68 In 2014, ISIL exercised significant control over portions of Syrian and Iraqi territory.69 The situation in
Syria has worsened given the ongoing civil war between Bashar AlAssad’s autocratic regime and the dismembered rebel forces.70 The
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presence of Russian and Iranian forces and non-state actors such as
Hezbollah further complicates the current situation.71
After considering the situation in Iraq and Syria, then-U.S. President Barack Obama announced on September 10, 2014, the formation of a broad international coalition to defeat ISIL, emphasizing: “our objective is clear: We will degrade, and ultimately destroy,
ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”72 Later, announcing that the coalition would act in accordance
with “five mutually reinforcing lines of effort,” which include:
providing military support to partners; impeding the flow of foreign
fighters; stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; addressing the humanitarian crisis in the region; and exposing ISIL’s true nature.73
The legal argument for this global coalition’s resort to armed
force seems unexplained at first glance. Prior to the commencement
of the air-strike campaign by the U.S.-led coalition, a letter dated
September 23, 2014 from the then-U.S. Permanent Representative
to the U.N., Samantha Power to the former U.N. Secretary General,
Ban Ki-Moon, provides an interesting legal rationale for the coalition’s activities.74 According to Ambassador Power, the U.S. and its
allies are acting in exercise of the right to collective self-defense in
favor of the Iraqi Government and only against ISIL.75 The letter
states that “Iraq has asked the [U.S.] to lead international efforts to
strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Syria in order to end the
continuing attacks on Iraq, to protect Iraqi citizens, and ultimately
to enable and arm Iraqi forces to perform their task of regaining control of the Iraqi borders.”76 Furthermore, the letter clarifies that the
actions of the U.S. and its allies in Syria are directed only against
ISIL and because the Syrian Government is “unwilling or unable to
prevent the use of its territory for such attacks.”77
71

Id. at 1, 35.
The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/seci/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
73
Id.
74
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i. Panama and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL
Panama is part of this “Global Coalition” alongside sixty-eight
other states and four intergovernmental organizations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Arab League
and Interpol).78 By way of a press release dated February 5, 2015,
Panama’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the country’s decision to join the coalition against ISIL.79 Despite failing to specify
the nature of its involvement, Panama stated that it had made such a
decision without compromising its principles of being a peace-loving nation that promotes dialogue and peaceful coexistence between
peoples.80 After several months, another press release specified that
Panama’s involvement is focused in stopping ISIL’s financing and
funding,81 also asserting that it was not contributing to the coalitions’ military activities and hinted at the possibility of providing
humanitarian aid to civilians displaced by the conflict.82 Nonetheless, as early as 2016, Newsweek listed Panama among the “coalition members providing unspecified support.”83 Moreover, the coalition’s own website fails to specify the type of support that Panama
[UPDATED to add statement of the U.N. Secretary-General], JUST SECURITY
(Sept. 23, 2014, 3:21 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-article-51-letters-force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/, (explaining the U.S. position in regards to airstrikes in Syria and the implied endorsement of the airstrikes
by the U.N. Secretary-General).
78
73 Partners, THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST DAESH, http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/.
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coalition of the International Community against the Islamic State] (Feb. 5, 2015)
(on file with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Panama), http://mire.gob.pa/noticias/2015/02/05/panama-se-une-coalicion-de-la-comunidad-internacional-contra-estado-islamico.
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Id.
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Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Panama, Panamá apoya
esfuerzos para prevenir financiamiento del terrorismo [Panama supports efforts to
prevent the financing of terrorism] (Nov. 17, 2015) (on file with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Panama), http://mire.gob.pa/noticias/2015/11/17/panamaapoya-esfuerzos-para-prevenir-financiamiento-del-terrorismo.
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United We Stand: A Break Down of What Each Member of the International Coalition Allied against ISIS Contributes to the Fight, NEWSWEEK
(SPECIAL EDITION), Feb. 2016, at 72-73 [Hereinafter United We Stand].
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is providing.84 While Panama has consistently clarified that its support to the coalition is non-military in character and mostly limited
to countering the financing of ISIL, it remains difficult to reconcile
this position with the factual reality.
As specified by its own website, the Global Coalition is unique
in its membership, scope and commitment.85 It has objectives that
go beyond the military campaign.86 Nevertheless, it is quite hard to
separate these non-military objectives with the military component
of the Coalition, when its main objective is both the ideological and
military defeat of ISIL. Panama, by joining the Global Coalition,
expressed its support for this ultimate end and consequently endorsed, directly or indirectly, the U.S.-led airstrikes in both Iraq and
Syria.
It is relevant to note that besides the goal of providing military
support to allies, all the other lines of effort can be accomplished by
complying with pre-existing international commitments - including
binding international instruments.87 Binding UNSC Resolutions,
adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, impose on all member-States of the U.N. the obligation to undertake efforts to prevent
the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria, and prevent the financing of terrorist groups, inter alia ISIL.88
With regard to efforts focused on addressing the humanitarian
crisis in the region, it can be argued that all States are authorized to
provide humanitarian assistance to civilians and hors de combat in
armed conflicts. This authorization is derived from the IHL customary rule governing “access for humanitarian relief to civilians in
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Partners, THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST DAESH, http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
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See Alonso Illueca, Panamá y la Lucha Mundial Contra el Terrorismo
[Panama and the Global Struggle Against Terrorism], LA ESTRELLA DE
PANAMÁ, Feb. 17, 2015.
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See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014); S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014);
S.C. Res. 2195 (Dec. 19, 2014); S.C. Res. 2199 (Feb. 12, 2015).
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need,” which is applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts.89 Although humanitarian relief functions are
primarily exercised by humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), nothing expressly
prohibits States from providing such assistance.90 In any event, the
assisting entity or State would need the consent of the State concerned, and the assistance provided must be both impartial and nondiscriminatory.91 Lastly, this authorization could also find its basis
in the duty to ensure respect, protection, and human treatment for
individuals no longer or not participating in hostilities derived from
common article 3 of the GCs.92
Considering that the coalition lacks a founding legal document,
it is challenging to ascertain when one of its leading member-States
is acting in its personal capacity or on behalf of the broader membership. This point is illustrated by the recent Gulf diplomatic crisis
were some States, inter alia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (all members of the Coalition) broke diplomatic
ties with Qatar (also a member) for supposedly financing terrorism
(one of the objectives which the coalition is supposed to counter).93
Responding to this, the U.S. Air Force’s Central Command spokesperson stressed that the U.S. “and the coalition are grateful to the

89
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 193-94 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).
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Id. at 196.
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Id. at 196-97.
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See, I Geneva Convention, supra note 62, at art. 3; II Geneva Convention,
supra note 62, at art. 3; III Geneva Convention, supra note 62, at art. 3; IV Geneva
Convention, supra note 62, at art. 3, 23, 38, 39; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, art. 18, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter II Additional Protocol]. Accord, Ruth A. Stoffels, Legal regulation of humanitarian assistance in armed conflict: Achievements and gaps, 86 IRRC 515,
518-20, 537-38 (2004) (discussing the right of third states to provide humanitarian
assistance in armed conflicts and what to do when such right is denied by one of
the parties to the conflict).
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Patrick Wintour, Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties
with Qatar, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-tieswith-qatar-over-terrorism.
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Qataris for their long-standing support of our presence and their enduring commitment to regional security.”94 In this sense, it seems
difficult to reconcile the ‘apparent’ collective position of the coalition members with actions and reasoning of Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
ii. The Coalition’s Conflict with ISIL as a Non-International
Armed Conflict
The characterization of the Coalition’s ongoing conflict with
ISIL is a complicated affair given the plurality of actors involved
(State and non-State).95 If we rely on Ambassador Power’s rationale,96 the conflict with ISIL can be categorized as a non-international armed conflict (“NIAC”) with a transnational character.
Within the meaning of Common Article 3 to the GCs, which reads
that NIACs are “armed conflicts not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”.97
This definition explains that if a conflict within the territory of a
State party to the GC is not an IAC, i.e. between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties of the GCs, it could prima facie be considered a NIAC.
In the case at hand, the situation in Syria and Iraq can be qualified separately and prima facie as NIACs, as both States are facing
a military threat from non-State actors within their own territory
(ISIL in the case of Iraq, and ISIL and other non-State actors in
Syria).98 As mentioned before, Iraq is a party to the GCs since
1956,99 while Syria has been a State party since November 2,
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See, e.g., Julia Zorthian, Who’s Fighting Who in Syria, TIME (Oct. 7,
2015); Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps, BBC (Oct. 21, 2017),
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99
Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries – Iraq, supra note 64.
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1953.100 Therefore, drawing upon GCs’ mutually exclusive definitions of IACs and NIACs, both conflicts could be characterized as
NIACs.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) in the jurisdiction phase of Prosecutor v. Tadic determined that a NIAC exists “whenever there is . . . protracted armed
violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.”101 In Tadic, the
ICTY stated that for the purposes of distinguishing between armed
conflicts (within the meaning of Common Article 3) and other less
serious forms violence (internal disturbances and tensions), the test
provided by Article 1 of Additional Protocol II (“AP II”) is accepted.102 This test provides that a conflict can be characterized as a
NIAC whenever the following criteria are met: the hostilities must
reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties to the conflict
must possess organized military forces.103
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq also seem to fall beneath the
scope of the more restrictive definition of NIAC provided by AP
II.104 AP II introduces, inter alia, a requirement of territorial control
for the non-state actor party to the conflict, in order to carry out “sustained and concerted military operations.”105 Given that Syria and
Iraq are not parties to AP II,106 its direct application by way of treaty
law remains questionable.107 Nonetheless, most of AP II provisions
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are considered part of customary international law,108 or applied as
a matter of policy.
As recognized in Ambassador Power’s letter, the Iraqi government does not control its borders and it is subject to “continuing”
attacks from ISIL.109 The letter also acknowledges that ISIL possesses several strongholds in Syria.110 Besides this letter, other
sources recognize the control that ISIL exercises over significant
parts of Iraqi and Syrian territory.111 The fact that ISIL exercises
control over portions of territory and constantly engages in military
hostilities with different forces provides support to the theory that
both conflicts have reached the threshold of a NIAC.112
iii. The Coalition’s Activities in Syria as an International
Armed Conflict
As already stated, an IAC exists whenever one State resorts to
any form of armed force against another State. When an international coalition uses force against a non-State armed group within
the territory of another State, with the explicit consent of the territorial State, there is no IAC.113 However, if the consent of the State in
question is absent then the conflict might be considered an IAC.114
108
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Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic argue that, absent the consent
of the territorial State, the active exercise of hostilities between a
foreign State and a non-State actor in the territory of another State
(the territorial State) would activate the application of laws governing IACs between the foreign State and the non-State actor.115
Akande in one of his scholarly dispositions explains that this position finds support, inter alia, in scholarly writings and the jurisprudence of national and international tribunals,116 including the International Court of Justice.117
Currently, the U.S.-led coalition engages in attacks against ISIL
in Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government (led
by Al-Assad). Recently, the U.S. executed a punitive airstrike
against a Syrian air force base.118 The rationale offered was that the
attack on regime troops within Syrian jurisdiction was justified because it intended to punish and deter the future use of chemical
weapons in the context of the Syrian civil war.119 In light of these
new facts and the legality of the aforementioned rationale, could the
situation between Syria and the U.S. be characterized as an IAC?
Notwithstanding the “unwilling or unable” doctrine, if Syria considers that the coalition’s ongoing airstrikes violate its sovereignty, the
IAC claim may have a legal basis.
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III.

THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Traditionally, the law of neutrality in IHL distinguishes between
two types of States: neutral and belligerent.120 Belligerents States
are those engaged in hostilities, while neutral States are those not
taking part in hostilities.121 This part of IHL is governed by customary international law122 and the following conventions: The Hague
Convention (V) on Neutral Powers in case of War on Land (1907)123
and the Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutral Powers in Naval War
(1907).124
With the adoption of the U.N. Charter, the law of neutrality underwent significant setbacks.125 One of the principles of the U.N.
Charter requires all member States to provide assistance to the organization at all times and refrain from providing assistance to any
State on which the U.N. is taking any type of action (preventive or
enforcement).126 Moreover, Article 25 of the U.N. Charter establishes the binding character of UNSC resolutions on all member
states, in particular the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII. If the
Council dictates enforcement measures (including the resort to
armed force) States are obliged to comply with them, notwithstanding the laws of neutrality, i.e., the concept of neutrality as a “permissive legal status.”127 Reflecting on this, Maria Gavouneli notes
that in the U.N. collective security system the idea of “neutral unilateralism” remains foreign.128 She also recognizes that in the U.N.
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system there will always be room for decentralized action.129 Gavouneli concludes that in these few cases where “the UN member
states fail to respond adequately and sufficiently in terms of both
time and substance,”130 some fragments of the law of neutrality will
play an auxiliary role in the law of armed conflict.131 The latter
states that whenever the UNSC has not adopted any type of measure
and where there is an armed conflict, the U.N. Member States are
free to maintain their status as neutral powers.132
A similar argument arises in the case of collective security arrangements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty133 and the Rio
Treaty,134 which establish that an armed attack against one Member
State constitutes an armed attack against all members. In such cases
and if the treaty in question is invoked, States’ parties are theoretically obliged to provide assistance and exercise the right to individual or collective self-defense against the aggressor in accordance
with the provisions established in the U.N. Charter.135 If the States
concerned acted in accordance with their treaty commitments by exercising individual or collective self-defense, they would compromise their neutral status under IHL.136 In the absence of collective
self-defense arrangements, States are entitled to maintain their neutral status, as long as the UNSC is not seized on the matter and has
not determined the existence of an act of aggression and adopted
appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.137
Hence, contemporary jus ad bellum directly affects the laws of
neutrality. Whenever the UNSC is seized on the matter by either
implementing enforcement measures or authorizing the exercise of
individual and collective self-defense, the law of neutrality remains
inapplicable to all the States concerned.138 However, if the Council
129
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has failed to act, the law of neutrality becomes applicable as a set of
auxiliary rules.139 Additionally, the law of neutrality is only applicable to IACs and certain NIACS (belligerency recognition), as contemporary international law does not recognize insurgent groups as
neutral powers.140
Recent developments in IHL have raised claims that a new “category” of States has emerged in the context of armed conflicts.141
The III Geneva Convention (“GC III”) introduces in Article 4(B)(2)
the expression “neutral or non-belligerent Power,” which entails the
existence of a new category of States in armed conflicts: the nonbelligerent State. Yves Sandoz finds no explanation for “this exceptional addition of the expression ‘non-belligerent’ after ‘neutral’
powers.”142 Moreover, Sandoz also signals that the “non-belligerent
Power” concept was not discussed in the 1949 Diplomatic Conference or in the 1948 International Red Cross Conference.143 According to Sandoz, the origin of this term can be found in the 1947 Conference of Government Experts, where the French Delegate introduced the term ‘non-belligerent’ States, with specific reference to
WWII.144 Finally, Sandoz concludes that the term ‘neutral’ States
covers all States not participating in a given armed conflict, while
the term “non-belligerent” lacks factual meaning for interpreting GC
III.145
As already explained, the law of neutrality survived the U.N.
Charter and remains applicable in cases where the latter is not implemented. The ICRC has recognized that in cases of collective self139
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defense and UNSC enforcement actions, the U.N. Charter provisions prevail over the laws of neutrality.146 Below, we will analyze
the categories of States, within the context of the laws of neutrality,
which are listed as follows: neutral, non-belligerent, belligerent and
co-belligerent States.
a.

Neutral States
Lassa Oppenheim describes neutrality as “an attitude of impartiality deliberately taken up by a State not implicated in a war; neutrality cannot begin before the outbreak of war.”147 Oppenheim also
states, “the duty of impartiality compromises to-day abstention from
any active or passive co-operation with belligerents.”148 He concludes that “the duties of neutrality are incumbent upon [States] as
long as they do not expressis verbis or by unmistakable acts declare
that they will be parties to the war.”149
Before the advent of the U.N., the practice of States was to notify
third States of the initiation of the conflict in order to enable them to
adopt the necessary attitude of impartiality.150 However, notifications were never considered legally necessary.151 In the U.N. era,
notifications have been abandoned as the use of force in contravention with the U.N. Charter has been proscribed.152 The rules governing the neutrality status of States are binding as part of treaty and
customary international law.153
The ICRC has compiled a glossary that provides for IHL key
terms’ definitions in which “neutral State” is defined as a “State that
has chosen to be neutral either permanently or only in a particular
IAC, or in certain cases in a NIAC.”154 The glossary also explains
146
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that neutrality does not imply ideological impartiality; it does not
require the State to abstain from showing its preference in regard to
another State.155 However, a neutral state may not openly participate
in hostilities.156 The State should also abstain from lending assistance to belligerents, recruiting troops for belligerents, allowing
third parties to do so in its territory, or supply the belligerents with
military equipment or with military intelligence.157
According to the V Hague Convention, a neutral State must ensure respect for its neutrality and if necessary may resort to force in
case of any violations in its territory.158 The ICRC notes that a neutral State must treat opposing belligerents with impartiality, which
creates a prohibition on discrimination.159 By non-discrimination,
the ICRC forbids differential treatment of belligerents in the specific
context of armed conflict; it does not affect preexisting commercial
relations.160Additionally, the XIII Hague Convention provides that
“the supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power
to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war material of
any kind whatever, is forbidden.”161
Andrea Gioia considers that duties of neutral States can be qualified as duties of abstention (from providing military aid to belligerents), prevention (defend its territory’s inviolability), and impartiality (towards belligerents on sensitive diplomatic, commercial and
political issues).162 Gioia asserts that such duties stem from the general principle of impartiality and constitute the core of neutrality.163
Robert Kolb and Richard Hyde argue that if the neutral state violates its aforementioned duties, it loses the entitlement to be treated
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as a neutral.164 For example, if it violates the duty of prevention,
which requires active protection of the inviolability of its territory,
“it will expose itself to belligerent action on its territory to safeguard
the essential interests and rights of the aggrieved belligerent.”165
The U.N. General Assembly in its Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the
“Definition of Aggression” mentions among the acts that qualify as
acts of aggression, regardless of a declaration of war, “the action of
a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal
of another State, to be used by the other State for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third State.”166 This list of acts of aggression
provided by Resolution 3314 is considered to reflect customary international law.167 In this sense, the duty of prevention permeates to
jus ad bellum given that non-compliance under the specific circumstances underlined by Resolution 3314 constitutes casus belli.168
However, in cases not involving the use of a neutral State’s territory and the exercise of the right of self-defense, the assertion that
the aggrieved belligerent can resort to force remains dubious at best.
In contemporary international law, a violation of the laws of neutrality gives rise to the legitimate right of the aggrieved State to take
reprisals and countermeasures.169 Nonetheless, this right does not
justify any action contrary to the prohibition on the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.170
Heller explains that the relationship between the law of neutrality and jus ad bellum is defined by the different kinds of violations
of neutrality.171 These violations can be classified in two instances:
situations where the neutral State affirmatively supports one of the
164
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belligerents, and where the neutral State is unwilling or unable to
prevent a belligerent from using its territory for hostile acts (duty of
prevention).172 With regard to the former, the law of neutrality requires States to refrain from materially supporting one of the belligerents.173 Nonetheless, providing material support to one of the belligerents does not automatically end the State’s neutral status.174 The
affected State may be entitled to reparations or prone to overlook
this violation of the law of neutrality.175 However, the mere violation
of the law of neutrality would not authorize the aggrieved belligerent
to use of force.176
b.

Non-Belligerent States
Although certain authors reject the existence of non-belligerent
States as sub-category of States in the context of armed conflicts,177
others defend its existence. Particularly, Gioia articulates that nonbelligerency is an intermediate position between neutrality and belligerency,178 and that States may resort to such position without immediately violating international law.179 Gioia also explains that
“non-belligerency” or “qualified neutrality” can be employed for situations where a State does not wish to enter the conflict on the side
of one belligerent, but at the same time does not choose to be bound
by the traditional laws of neutrality.180 Additionally, Gioia argues
that non-belligerent States, though not bound by neutrality obligations, enjoy some of the rights that neutral states enjoy vis-à-vis belligerents. Among such rights is the inviolability of a State’s territory,
which does not flow from the law of neutrality but from the U.N.
Charter.181
In regards to actions of non-belligerent States favoring belligerents, the consequences flowing from such actions remain unclear.
Gioia asserts that “un-neutral” behavior from neutral States, though
172
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themselves not constituting acts of aggression may be seen as
amounting to complicity with one of the belligerents.182 This rationale is applied mutatis mutandis to non-belligerent states.183 Nevertheless, Gioia argues that in those circumstances, the aggrieved
belligerent State may not justify its actions by virtue of its right to
self-defense nor take lawful reprisals against the non-belligerent
State, as the laws of neutrality do not bind the latter.184 In any event,
the law of reprisals does not justify the resort to armed force.185 The
only exception allowing for the use force seems to be the use of a
neutral State’s territory by one of the belligerents to conduct military
operations against another belligerent.186
Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that as a matter of legal principle and in view of relevant State practice, the concept of a “nonbelligerent” State lacks factual legal basis.187 The sub-category of
non-belligerent States in armed conflicts was and should still be considered a “euphemism designed to cover violations of international
law in the field of neutral obligations.”188
c.

Belligerent States
The term ‘belligerent State’ is defined as a State engaged in an
armed conflict, or more simply as a State waging hostilities.189
Treaty and customary international law govern the conduct of belligerents.190 It is also agreed that belligerency is defined in contrast
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with the laws of neutrality, which provides important guidance for
determining when a State becomes belligerent or co-belligerent.191
Nathalie Weizmann explains that in accordance with the law of
neutrality, a State becomes a belligerent in an armed conflict whenever it declares war against another State, participates in hostilities
to a significant extent, or engages in systematic or substantial violations of its neutrality duties of impartiality and non-participation.192
For the purposes of the present study, it seems appropriate to not
consider declarations of war as an action that provides for a state of
belligerency. After 1945, declarations of war ceased to be instruments for proclaiming de jure existence of war. 193 At the present
time, for a state of war to exist, one of the parties to the conflict has
to make its intentions clear by actually commencing hostilities or
making extensive preparations.194
d..

Co-Belligerent States
Whenever two or more States are engaged in an armed struggle
against a common enemy, the doctrine of co-belligerency becomes
applicable.195 The term ‘co-belligerent’ is generally understood as a
State fighting with another Power against a common enemy.196 Basically, the term involves two or more States undertaking joint operations against a rival entity in the context of an armed conflict.197
Traditionally, the doctrine of co-belligerency has been applied exclusively to IACs.198 Nonetheless, some of its features have been
applied to NIACs. For example, the pooling of military resources in
191
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favor of one of the parties of a NIAC has been regarded as a form of
co-belligerency.199
Different authors understand the term ‘co-belligerent’ as synonymous with “ally.”200 The U.S. Manual for Military Commission
defines co-belligerent as “any State or armed force joining and directly engaged with the [U.S.] in hostilities or directly supporting
hostilities against a common enemy.”201 Other groups of scholars
focus on establishing an effective test for co-belligerency. In a 2004
memo, Jack Goldsmith wrote “mere participation in any aspect of
the occupation itself will not always suffice to constitute co-belligerency, especially when a State’s specific contribution has no direct
nexus with belligerent or hostile activities.”202 He then concluded:
“the determination whether a State is a ‘co-belligerent’ by virtue of
its participation . . . turns on whether the participation is closely
related to ‘hostilities.’”203
Gioia agrees with Goldsmith by stating, “under the traditional
law of neutrality, a violation of neutrality obligations did not automatically make the State concerned a co-belligerent.”204 Morris
Greenspan proposes a very narrow test for determining co-belligerency: the State has to be in “fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”205 Goldsmith and
Curtis Bradley present a co-belligerency threshold for neutral states,
which is surpassed whenever they engage in systematic or signifi-
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cant violations of their duties under the law of neutrality, i.e., prevention, abstention and impartiality.206 Greenspan, Bradley, and
Goldsmith seem to offer more narrow tests, focused on the participation in hostilities or systematic/significant violations of the law of
neutrality.207 The ICTY’s jurisprudence also seems to favor the participation in hostilities approach.208 In the Blaskic case, the Court
hinted that joint military operations were the key for establishing the
status of co-belligerent.209
Christopher Greenwood goes even further in arguing that a State
not originally participating in an armed conflict would only commit
an act of war and become a party to the conflict by “giving direct
support to the military operations of one of the belligerents.”210 He
excludes from this type of material assistance the provision of financial, intelligence and political support.211 Similarly, Michael Bothe
and Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg claim that the fact that a neutral
State provides “unneutral services,” i.e. rendering assistance to one
of the belligerents, is not sufficient to justify the use of force against
it.212
In contrast, the former U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, offered in one of
his reports a contemporary-broad test for co-belligerency.213 In
206
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2013, Heyns stressed, “co-belligerency is a concept that applies to
international armed conflicts and entails a sovereign State becoming
a party to a conflict, either through formal or informal processes.214
A treaty of alliance may be concluded as a formal process, while an
informal process could involve providing assistance to or establishing a common cause with belligerent forces.”215
Jens Ohlin proposes another interesting test, in which he argues
that in accordance with the traditional doctrine of co-belligerency
(which stems from the law of neutrality) a belligerent State must
give a third State the opportunity to declare its neutrality before declaring it a co-belligerent.216 If the original state in question refuses
to make the declaration, it can be considered a co-belligerent (a party
to the conflict) and therefore a lawful subject of an attack.217 Ohlin
and Heyns’ tests constitute the more broadly construed proposals,
presumably extending co-belligerent status to States not directly
participating in hostilities.218
After briefly examining some of the abovementioned positions,
Weizmann concludes that the following criterion is the most useful
for recognizing co-belligerent States: the State has to provide “systematic or substantial supply of war materials, military troops, or
financial support in association, cooperation, assistance or common
cause with another belligerent.”219 This approach seems to take a
middle ground between the broad and narrow tests mentioned
above.
As showcased by the differing views among legal scholars, the
threshold between violations of the law of neutrality and the co-belligerency status is unclear. While some authors rely on the State’s
direct involvement in hostilities, others seem to rest on more subjective elements such as refusal to declare its neutrality or the establishment of a common cause. The following section explores
214
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whether Panama became a co-belligerent state or maintained its status of a neutral power by joining the aforementioned coalitions.
IV.
PANAMA AS A CO-BELLIGERENT OR NEUTRAL STATE?
The underlying fact that contributes to our analysis is that in each
of the military coalitions’ subjects of the present study (WWII, the
Coalition of the Willing, and the Global Coalition to counter ISIL),
Panama did not contribute to military operations. Although Panama
failed, at times, to specify the nature of its involvement, it remains
difficult to claim that it was directly engaged in hostilities.220 This
fact rules out the possibility of Panama being characterized ab initio
as a belligerent State. Therefore, the question posed is whether Panama is/was a neutral or co-belligerent state given its presumed violations of the law of neutrality.
By joining the above-mentioned international coalitions, Panama openly expressed its support for one of the warring belligerents.221 This amounted to a violation of the duty of impartiality. The
fact that the coalitions’ ultimate goal was the military defeat of a
common enemy (the Axis Powers, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and
ISIL, respectively) adds to the gravity of the neutrality law violations. In the case of the Coalition to Counter ISIL, the existence of
an asymmetric conflict between the Coalition and ISIL would translate into the inapplicability of the law of neutrality, as ISIL cannot
be regarded as a belligerent. However, as noted above, Syria could
plausibly argue that the ongoing operations of the Coalition within
its territory are part of an ongoing IAC, as that it deems such operations unlawful and in contravention with the U.N. Charter.
Applying the co-belligerence tests specified in the previous sections to Panama’s actions under the abovementioned coalitions
220
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could give rise, in some cases, to plausible claims of co-belligerency. Particularly, Panama’s involvement in all of these coalitions
fits perfectly into Ohlin and Heyns’ tests. In joining the coalitions,
Panama established a common cause with its members and failed to
declare its neutrality. In contrast, Greenspan, Goldsmith, Greenwood, Bothe, Heintschel, and Weizmann’s proposals rule out the cobelligerency claim in two of the cases (Coalition of the Willing and
against ISIL) because of the fact that Panama is/was not actively
involved in the exercise of military hostilities. Moreover, the absence of factual evidence of any type of financial contribution to the
war aim adds to the claim against Panama’s co-belligerency.
Which of these two schools of thought should prevail? Existing
international norms seem to be inclined towards the narrow test of
co-belligerency.222 Specifically, the peremptory norm against the
use of force seems to deem Ohlin and Heyns’ tests inapplicable. Absent an act of aggression or a UNSC enforcement action, any resort
to armed force against a sovereign State would constitute a violation
of the prohibition on the use of force, an erga omnes223 and jus cogens norm.224 Violations of the laws of neutrality authorize the aggrieved State to resort to lawful countermeasures and reprisals.225
However, countermeasures or reprisals that include the use of force
against neutral states are considered unlawful.226 Hence, Ohlin and
Heyns’ tests should be interpreted in accordance with the jus cogens
prohibition on the use of force. A State’s incorporation to a coalition
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does not constitute an armed attack or an act of aggression within
the meaning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314.227
In the three cases put forth, Panama was a co-belligerent in one
of the conflicts and a neutral state violating its duty of impartiality
in the other two. During WWII, Panama was a co-belligerent because: 1) the lege lata established that by declaring war against another State, a country could become part of an armed conflict,228 2)
it was part of a military coalition against the Axis Powers,229 and 3)
it had leased its territory to the U.S. for military purposes, thus effectively contributing to the war efforts.230 The fact that Panama voluntarily agreed to lease its territory for the conduct of defensive military preparations and the transit of troops to and from the Pacific
and Atlantic fronts constituted a violation of its neutral duty of prevention, which exposed the territory to belligerent action from the
aggrieved belligerent. Even today, in similar circumstances, the international law would find this action by Panama inconsistent with
its obligations under jus ad bellum, particularly in light of UNGA
Resolution 3314.231
In the other two cases, Panama can only be considered a neutral
State. The country did not provide any type of military or financial
aid to the war efforts, and it did not allow belligerent factions to use
its territory.232 By joining the Coalition of the Willing and the
Global anti-ISIL coalition, Panama violated its duty of impartiality.
However, it is very difficult to argue that these violations were significant or systematic in any form, as it only involved an expression
of political support for the coalition’s military actions. The fact that
Panama openly chose a side in each conflict could have given rise
to the use of countermeasures by the aggrieved States (Iraq in 2003
and Syria in 2015 onwards) if the regimes of such States considered
that they were or are subject to foreign military intervention by the
US-led coalitions.
227
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V.
CONCLUSION
In 2007, Heintschel von Heinegg raised similar claims as the
ones presented in this paper in regards to Germany’s violations of
the laws of neutrality in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom
(2003).233 Although not a member of the coalition, Germany allowed and assisted the U.S. armed forces in the transport of military
equipment and supplies through German territory.234 Heintschel von
Heinegg argues that Germany violated the laws of neutrality; the
fact that Iraq failed to react is irrelevant.235 According to the German
scholar,
States should therefore think twice before departing from the essentials of neutrality. If they were to be confronted with a belligerent
far more powerful than Iraq in a future conflict, the law of neutrality
could prove to be the only legal order effectively protecting their
legitimate interests as States not taking part in the conflict.236
This paper aimed at portraying a very troubling practice by Panama consisting of joining international coalitions without measuring
possible international legal consequences in the context of both jus
ad bellum and jus in bello. The fact that Iraq and Syria failed to react
to Panama’s violations of the laws of neutrality is irrelevant as a
matter of law. Panama may have weighed the political advantages
of joining the coalition against the legal and practical risks. In this
sense, as a matter of policy, Panama seems have concluded that an
attack from Iraq or Syria was highly unlikely at the time. In the future and prior to joining a coalition involved in an armed conflict,
Panama should examine the possible legal consequences of such action.
It would also be relevant to learn from the experiences of other
States. For reflection and correction we should examine Costa
Rica’s example. In 2004, after the country joined the Coalition of
the Willing (2003), the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme
Court declared such act null, void, and unconstitutional as it affected
the country’s neutrality, constituted an unlawful declaration of war
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(absent the approval of the Congress who has the exclusive competence for declaring war), and was contrary to relevant norms of international law.237 The Court instructed the Executive Power to request that the United States exclude Costa Rica from the list of Coalition member States. Subsequently, Costa Rica’s Foreign Minister
asked Washington to remove its country from the coalition’s “list”
through a diplomatic note.238
For restraint, Indonesia is the perfect model. In January 2016,
Indonesia was victim of a terrorist attack from ISIL.239 Despite this,
a diplomatic official stated that it was very unlikely that Indonesia
would join the anti-ISIL coalition.240 The diplomat stressed that Indonesia’s contribution to the battle against ISIL was centered in wining the ideological struggle against violent extremism.241 Additionally, he said that U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations would continue
to focus on the exchange of intelligence and the continuation of political cooperation in international forums.242
Countries without military forces and other victims of terrorism
have shown more care for the legal consequences of joining an international coalition than Panama. In the case of the anti-ISIL coalition, if Panama wanted to contribute to the global fight against terrorism, compliance with several UNSC resolutions requiring countries to stop the flow of foreign combatants and the financing of ISIL
would have sufficed. If Panama intended to provide humanitarian
assistance to victims of ISIL attacks, it could have done so independently of its affiliation to the coalition. If Panama wanted to expose ISIL’s true nature, a more proactive role in international forums dealing with the subject matter would have been sufficient.
Panama, as a small and peaceful State must comport with international law. Considering that it is one of the few States in the world
237
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without a standing army and with a Canal that it has pledged to
maintain neutral, it must exercise the utmost caution and restraint
when taking delicate strategic and political decisions - such as joining a coalition with a military component. So far, there have been
no consequences for Panama’s actions in the cases presented above.
However, in the near future, Panama may find that States are not so
benevolent with violations of neutrality. In such cases, the best defense is maintaining and protecting the neutrality of the Canal strictu
sensu, fully complying with UNSC resolutions and implementing
the applicable collective security arrangements.

